



## Nigeria's Politics of Electoral Reforms: in who's Interest?

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**Abstract:** Election is a major character and indispensable to modern democracy. As a means by which citizens decide their leaders and policies, it is very strategic to every democracy and its conduct and credibility determine legitimacy and success or otherwise of a political system. Its process of conferring popular legitimacy on both the state and leaders involves many things which are embodied in an electoral system also as provided within a state's legal framework. Over the years there have been calls, agitations and outcry for electoral reforms in Nigeria in addition to the electoral acts and many constitutional provisions regulating the electoral system. This article examines the politics of electoral reforms in Nigeria. Nigerian politicians'/elites have partly devised electoral reforms as means of securing public legitimacy and popularity; it has become a means of accommodating and rewarding parties allies and loyalists, patrons and clients; and a diversionary tactic to skew the public attention towards one end; there appears no little or sincere political commitment towards the enactment of some of the electoral reforms; there is no much wrong with the past and present electoral system and laws, but lack or absence of genuine political commitment to enforce those laws. Nigerians have little confidence in the reforms due to insincere political will and commitment to enforce such reforms when finally approved. The article submits that mere electoral reforms in Nigeria are not adequate or capable of restoring credibility in elections, hope in the democracy and legitimacy. Enforcement of subsisting electoral laws, positive reorientation of the stakeholders, regulated use of money, and genuine commitment of all are vital to the success and credibility of elections in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Democracy, Election, Electoral Reform, Politics, and Nigeria.

### Introduction

Election is the central vein of democracy that marks direct encounter between citizens and their leaders, government and the political system. It is at the same time one of the most expensive aspects of democratic system for a lot of the state's human and material resources are expended in its every conduct. Conducting elections would, however, be meaningless unless they are credible, i.e. conform to established laws and acceptable to the citizens. The legitimacy of every government first lies in its ability to assume power through popular and legal means, i.e. credible elections. Similarly, the state is the sole establishment responsible for managing the affairs of all individuals' institutions and activities including organisation, conduct and management of

all electoral matters (Agbaje & Adejumo, 2006). Laws made by the state which, among others govern election are very important and strategic determinants of the type and quality of leadership as well as other succeeding events. There is, therefore, a significant relationship between a state, its politics, political culture, orientation, socialisation and conduct of elections (Animashaun, 2010; Agbaje & Adejumo, 2006; Renwick, 2010:1). Effective and efficient administration of election matters is, therefore, very crucial to every democratic setting as elections determine not only the security and stability of every state, but also the success or failure of a government in relation to its citizenry (Fombad, 2016). Nowadays, credibility of elections transcends beyond national borders and is also tied to international relations and politics, foreign aid, trade, military assistance, admission to some organisations and other benefits that may accrue to a state from the international front (Carter & Carter, 2016).

While election as a major component of democracy is gaining more attention globally, in developing democracies, it mostly comes with other resultant effects which necessitate the needs for review, reforms of the laws governing the conduct and management of such elections with states playing the central roles in such situations. This is because only the state can make and enforce both general and specific laws on all public matters and there are great expectations on it to make, unmake and or amend the laws to suit the changing trends and circumstances and for the cause of a just state and society. Although disputes are not desirable in any political system and elections, there can hardly be an election in states like Nigeria without any contest from the any of the stakeholders, especially the losing political parties and candidates. This prompts the importance of effective and efficient electoral laws in order to among others to provide for and the procedure of elections, guide and regulate the conduct of all the stakeholders, and the process in order to achieve a credible election in the overall interest of the public. Electoral laws, therefore, determine the process, the actions, how and when to win and or lose elections (Schultz, 2016).



### Statement of the Problem

The practice and success of every democracy rests on election. Conducting elections in Nigeria has since pre independence era become synonymous with crises, violence, legal battles, bitter politics oppositions, and attempts to cling on to power through orchestrated constitutional amendments of electoral laws. These altogether threaten the democratic base of the Nigerian state. The electoral laws and the bodies are responsible for the guidelines/laws provision and managing the organisation and conduct of elections respectively, and are also at the central stage of Nigeria's electoral reform and politics. However, these electoral laws are most times considered to be obsolete and implausible, while the electoral bodies are often accused of bias, incompetence; just as the ruling parties and politicians demonstrate typical African political character of hardly accepting defeat in elections, relinquishing power or conducting a peaceful transition as occurred in The Gambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Burundi, Kenya, Burkina-Faso and Uganda (Abrahamsen & Bareeba, 2016; Taylor, 2016). States in Africa South of the Sahara (Nigeria inclusive) have the poorest records of election conducts in which the public hardly bestows any confidence in the states and electoral bodies' integrity (Norris, Martinez, Coma, Nai & Gromping, 2016; Bermeo, 2016).

These problems have in Nigeria, the largest democracy in Africa with about 120, 000 polling units all over the federation, call for and also resulted in reviews and reforms of the country's electoral laws. However, the problems appear far from only the electoral management bodies and just the reforms of the laws, but also politics, motives behind, political will and commitment to execute substantive electoral laws, and or the outcomes of amendments and reforms in the name of attaining credible elections and genuine democracy. While calls and agitation for such reforms are unending, politicians, opposition and elites use same as an avenue to garner sympathy, popularity, and get jobs as reward for their loyalists and allies. Public resources are in the process wasted in the name of such reforms, while the outcomes are often swept under the carpet. For example, the most recent electoral reform in Nigeria was conducted in 2007-2008 where 1, 466 memoranda were received, 907 presentations made in addition to foreign expertise submissions. But all the recommendations of the Reform Committee were neither genuinely approved nor implemented (Electoral Reform Committee Report, 2008). The turnout of voters during elections, which conventionally indicates the legitimacy, popularity and confidence that voters have and repose in the democracy, election

and candidates as noted by Franklin & Mackie (1992), is drastically reducing when compared to the total number of registered voters during such exercises. Election stakeholders in Nigeria have also been over the years, playing poor roles in terms of credibility and success of elections in Nigeria (Suberu in Loughlin, et al., 2013).

### Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of this study are to

1. Explore the nature and trends of electoral reforms in Nigeria
2. Identify factors and politics that influence these reforms.
3. Evaluate the reforms in relation to the attainment of credible elections and a democratic state and society in Nigeria.

### Background to Elections in Nigeria

The history of elections in Nigeria is traced to the colonial period of 1923 when the first series of elections were held in Lagos and Calabar. The first, and then the colonial election into the Legislative Council as backed by the 1922 Cifford Constitution was held on September 20, 1923 for four (4) membership seats – three (3) for Lagos and one (1) for Calabar; the New Nigerian Democratic Party (NNDP) won three (3), while the Independent won one (1) of the seats (Tamuno, 1966, p. 18). From then on, some elections were held up to that of the 1954 Regional Houses of Assembly (Enugu, Ibadan and Kaduna) elections, and the Federal House of Representatives (Lagos). It was, however, in December, 1959 that the first general election was held in Nigeria for the Federal House of Representatives and a Senate, as well as Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the Federal Prime Minister from the leading majority Northern based largest political party, Northern People's Congress (NPC) in a coalition government with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) under a parliamentary/West Minster democracy together with regional Premiers (Clark, 1991).

Federal elections were also conducted five years thereafter in 1964 under the same West Minster Parliamentary democracy. Prior to the return to civilian democratic rule in October, 1979, another general election was conducted and for the first time, direct election in which all Nigerian eligible voters were allowed to directly elect their respective - National Assembly members (Senators and Representatives), States Governors and Houses of Assembly members, and Local Government Councils. In 1983, another general and direct election was conducted which returned the national, states and local executives as well as National Assembly executives and legislators.



The military coup of December 31, 1983 of General Buhari however, disrupted the democratic rule until when in 1989 the regime of General Babangida under the a new transition programme commenced series of elections from local, states and national assemblies and executive levels. But General Babangida's transition could not be fully actualised despite being the most prolonged transition programme in the history of Nigeria and having elected executives and legislators from local up to national levels except the presidential election results of June 12, 1993 (Dinneya, 2006). The presidential election results contested by Chief MKO Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Alhaji Bashir Usman Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC) were cancelled before it was even declared. From then on, Nigeria could not conduct any other general election under the military in until 1999 after preparing a short transition programme by the regime of General Abdussalam Abubakar. From the 1999 elections, the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections were all conducted under various civilian and democratic regimes. Within these periods, various electoral laws and commissions were established to organise and regulate conduct of elections all over the country and at federal and state levels.

In the same vein, Nigeria's conduct and management of elections and related matters were constitutionally vested in the various electoral bodies under the respective regimes as: Electoral Commission of Nigeria (Prime-minister Tafawa-Balewa); Federal Electoral Commission FEDECO (President Shagari); National Electoral Commission - NEC (General Babangida); National Electoral Commission of Nigeria – NECON (General Abacha); and the present one, the Independent National Electoral Commission – INEC established by the regime of General Abdussalam in August, 1998 under Decree No. 17 which was later incorporated into the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Therefore, apart from the Electoral Commission of Prime-minister Tafawa Balewa, all the subsequent electoral bodies in Nigeria were established by military regimes, and incorporated into the Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, 1989 and 1999. The trend also shows the dominance of the Nigerian military not only in the processes of organisation and conduct of elections, but also making and reforming the laws governing elections from the 1979 to 1998 when the substantive electoral body (INEC) was established.

Similarly, Nigeria's major electoral changes and amendments were under the recent times carried out in 2002, 2006 and 2010 with views to reflect peculiarities and changing trends in the political and democratic scenes. Each time such reforms are

to be carried out, politics, controversies, disagreements and suspicions trail the entire process. These are for the fact that Nigeria is heterogeneous in nature with varied and sometimes conflicting interests over political, economic and socio-cultural values, multi-party system which all affect electoral and democratic processes. This is in addition to the fact that whenever electoral reforms or amendments are carried out, there are tendencies for unfavourable outcomes to one or some of the stakeholders who desire the reforms or not, i.e. the status quo, citizens or the opposition (Hazan & Lenaar, 2012; Shugart, 2001).

### Theoretical Framework

This study uses the Rational Choice Theory of electoral reforms. This theory maintains that changes in electoral reforms are made as a result of the deliberately planned forecasts of elites to make and implement regulations and rules concerning elections in order to secure future elections, consolidate power and optimise political and electoral benefits (Hazan & Lenaar, 2012; Colomer, 2005). It posits that elites and politicians are fully aware of the electoral reforms and their outcomes whenever made, although individuals and parties who lose power control or are in opposition are more likely to promote reforms in elections (Hazan & Lenaar). The practice of democracy in most developing states is delicate for the fact that the institutions associated with it in such political systems are not very trustworthy (Marx & Suri, 2016). In this vein, most of Nigeria's elections have been associated with violence, rigging or other related offenses and irregularities (Clark, 1991; Joseph, 1986; Diamond, 1991; Obasanjo & Mabogunje, 1992). These calls for review and or upgrading of the electoral laws to fit the changing contexts and dimensions of elections in Nigeria restore hope and confidence in the system. At the same time, state authorities, ruling party and those in power accept or propose the idea of electoral reforms mostly when they know that the outcomes of such reforms will favour or at least not jeopardise their future electoral victories. They also succumb to pressure when there is the outcry from the public or the opposition to amend or reform the laws for better performance of the electoral system. Where the electoral reforms threaten the electoral chances of the status quo, various delay tactics, delayed legislative approval, poor execution of the laws may likely follow.

### Review of Related Literature

Numerous literatures are available on electoral reforms which Hazan & Lenaar (2012:63) described as extensive and involving transformation of the electoral laws and other complementary provisions.



Renwick (2010) identified what he referred to as both exogenous and endogenous factors that influence electoral reforms and further raised three fundamental questions on elections and electoral reforms as: first: who chooses the electoral system; what is the degree of political and politicians control of the election decision making processes; second, whose or what interest values do the chosen electoral systems protect or give out; do the involved politicians serve their own selfish interests or the general and popular good for all; how and what electoral system changes are there to take place? He proposes two motives of electoral reforms as those of 'power and value interests'. With power interest in which the politicians want to tactically and indirectly maximise their political powers and influence; and value interests in which the politicians strive to achieve the common good for all - accountable and popular leadership, credible election, etc. It is very common that many electoral reforms are engineered by either the opposition or those who are not in power (status quo). However, many at times, the status quo, especially in developing democracies resist and or are hesitant with such reforms. Kart (in Michael Gallagher, 2008) has enumerated six basic reasons why the status quo allows or calls for electoral reforms in a state as: threat to victory under the subsisting electoral laws in future elections; reforms obliged by outsiders (those who are not in power); where there are conflicts of interest among the winners of previous elections; the status quo is sure of its future electoral victory if such reforms are carried out; and dealing in electoral compensation with other targets .

Riker (as cited in Renwick, 2010) has lamented that most electoral systems are made with the manifest intentions of strengthening and or reinforcing political gains and advantages rather than achieving objectives of accountable leadership, credible electoral system and other public goods. Bermeo, (2016) has lamented what he called 'democratic backsliding', especially among developing democracies where states spearhead the degradation of institutions established for and meant to institutionalise and consolidate democracy. These, according to him, take the forms of increased strategic manipulation of elections and fierce intolerance of oppositions. One of the strategies used by politicians in politics of reforms is the timing of such reforms or conservative stands so they can exert significant influence over the reform processes and its outcomes as noted by Renwick, (2010).

It has also been lamented that although those who decide whether the electoral system needs to be changed and those who benefit from the status quo are different, those who wield political power are

more likely to twist or wedge the attempts to effect change in an electoral system if it may not favour them or the status quo (Renwick (2010). He maintained that the reforms which are initiated by the status quo or elites are more likely to be implemented as they are more able manipulate the results.

### Politics of Nigeria's Electoral Reforms

Elections, especially in developing democracies are a source of contention and violence, particularly between incumbent governments on one hand and opposition parties and groups on the other (Smidt, 2016) as many stakeholders are involved in electoral reforms, but the keys are the politicians and the citizens (Renwick, 2010). In his submission, (Renwick in Hazan & Lennar, 2012) has maintained that there are four major stakeholders that play strategic roles in electoral reforms as: citizens, judges, politicians and external actors (International Non Governmental Organisations and powerful states, etc.) with varying degrees of involvement and roles to play at the same or varying times. He further presented five range of both citizens and elite dominated electoral reforms into: massive imposition of reforms by the citizens which is independent of others whether internal or external; the public is mobilised and it then forces the politicians to accept and establish the reforms; politicians go with popular opinion and institute the reforms in line with popular desire; politicians independently institute changes independent of or without other influence; and where the elites/politicians desire to institute or establish the reforms but refrained by the fear of disconcerting public opinion.

Electoral reform is a popular issue depending on position as those in status quo may not favour electoral reforms for the fact they are in power courtesy of the existing system which additionally protects and promotes their interests and those who are not in power and have not succeeded with the current system and therefore want reforms for their advantages too or for the good of all (Hazan & Lennar, 2012). In Nigeria, a key issue that determines and influences politics of electoral reforms is what is generally seen and referred to as setting and getting 'jobs for the boys' or 'political reward' to campaign loyalist, party allies, members, patrons and other cohorts. This is characterised by constant reforms, but without practically truly enacting the outcomes, continuous repeat of such reforms by succeeding regimes and appointing their boys, puppets, agents and political allies while doing such reforms. Electoral reform has therefore become a tool for making appointments, providing access to state resources as a reward for alliance, support or patronage, and an act of deceit to woo popular support and



legitimacy for the status quo. These do not, however, negate the need and viability of electoral reforms when such are to be genuinely carried out in the interest of the democratic system and public.

### **The Need for Electoral Reforms**

The importance of electoral reforms in Nigeria and other developing democracies cannot be over-emphasised (Onapajo, 2015) and problems associated with elections can undermine the legitimacy of and trust in government as well as other institutions of democracy (James, 2012:3). An electoral system can be subjected to changes through several means, modes and by many different factors and circumstances just there are many stakeholders to the changes or reform processes. Most of electoral reforms involve and are influenced by politicians (Renwick in Hazan & Lenaar, 2012). Elections are held on a daily basis and across most states in the world, but as observed by Bishop and Hoeffler (2016), only about half of these elections are truly credible for the fact that they are marred by irregularities which impact negatively on the effectiveness and ability of the democracy itself to deliver what is expected and for both the states and the citizenry.

### **Electoral Laws and Conduct of Electoral Reforms**

Elections are organised and conducted under provisions of electoral laws which are entrenched in constitutions and other special laws of states. Although electoral laws and their peculiarities vary from one state to another, all are meant to ensure popular, peaceful and efficient conduct of elections and institution of legitimate policies, government and exercise of sovereignty by the electorates. All the elections conducted in Nigeria have under respective electoral laws yet, the problems associated with elections persist. This partly prompts the calls for further electoral reforms to address the problems. However, the real solutions to electoral problems in Nigeria do not really lie in the reforms themselves, but rather, strict enforcement of subsisting electoral laws. Strict enforcement and compliance with the electoral laws is practically lacking in Nigeria and without it, there will hardly be any success in the entire electoral system (see also Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2016). Similarly, the political will and commitment of power holders also determines the success or failure of the electoral reforms and implementations of the same. Indeed, many states and their governments are not really interested in any genuine electoral reforms and their enforcement, but only seek cheap popular legitimacy, succumb to internal pressure or win international support and recognition, especially that international aid donors and relief for

development are now tied to democracy and elections (Carter & Carter, 2016).

### **Democracy, Political Parties and Election in Nigeria**

Although democracy is a concept with universal value, characterised by abstractions, individuals, groups and state view, value and practice it from different perspectives with varied degrees of commitment (Przeworski, 2016; Urbinati, 2016). At the moment, democracy in many countries in trying times as many are bedevilled by disgruntlement among the citizenry, political parties and interest groups in relation to issues of elections and electoral integrity, roles of states in neutrality, operations of political parties, fundamental rights among others (Przeworski, 2016). This trend applies to Nigeria, which has since its independence also, been yearning and searching for the most suitable option, but yet to reach a meaningful stage (Fagge, 2002; Jega, 2007).

Political party as an institution is central to every democratic establishment and plays a strategic role in linking states and societies. It is also an important ingredient of democracy which determines and or influence the nature and type of government to be constituted, how political powers are to be distributed within the government and among politicians and how public policies are made and enacted. Through their existence and competition in the political arena, parties unite people and factions as individuals and groups that share related, but not necessarily same inclinations and agree on a common point because of party allegiance and agreements (Itzkovitch-Malka, 2016; Shomer, Put & Gedalya-Lavy, 2016; Ceron, 2012a; Ceron, 2012b). Their roles in democracy and elections is, however, trickery, whether they are themselves are democratic or not in their operations, especially in developing states like Nigeria, where intra and inter party squabbles have characterised the system (Kasabal, 2014). Intra party camps, factions, groups and wings are an integral part of politics, parties and found in both developed and developing democracies and states with great influence on activities, unity and strength of every political party as well as the entire political system in a state (Ceron, 2012a).

Election is very important for every state, society and democracy as a means by which citizens participate in managing their affairs, express their satisfaction and otherwise, for both the system and its operators (Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2016). Elections are in most democracies, contested into under platform of political parties which serve also as recruiting agents to various contestable offices. However, credible elections are not only dependent



on political parties and electoral management bodies, but also the ability of other state and non state institutions such as effective and efficient law enforcement agencies, election tribunal and the judiciary, civil society organisations and informed citizenry as noted by Diamond, (1991). Nigeria is ranked the 84<sup>th</sup> state in terms of quality and integrity of elections from the 139 countries studied in the year 2015 (Norris, et al, 2016). This low ranking position results from poor performance of all the stakeholders in elections. This, he added, is because elections in Nigeria are greatly hampered by violence as a result of deepening tension between the adherents of two major religions and regions of Islam and Christianity which are predominantly found in northern and southern regions respectively. In addition to that the state, its institutions and citizenry do not also play their roles effectively before, during and after elections.

Elections are an integral part of democracy, it is, therefore, paramount that elections in democracy must also be free, fair and open in addition to its periodic conduct (Deva, 2016). But for it to have legitimacy and popularity, the issues of openness, inclusion and participation of all stakeholders and proper conduct of their responsibilities must be appropriately observed by all stakeholders (Machin-Mastromatteo, 2016). Post election periods in developing democracies as Nigeria are characterized by often dissatisfaction and contestation of legitimacy in such elections and the entire system the by losers (Marx & Suri, 2016). There are several factors that come into interplay in such poor and or failure of elections, such as poor or low level of economic power (poverty), the character and quality of democratic institutions (political parties, electoral bodies, interest groups), societal level of socialisation, state and electoral bodies neutrality, politics of aid and development, especially by donor agencies and influence of advanced democracies (Norris, et al., 2016).

While international observatory missions have been participating in and are generally considered as effective monitors and determinants of election credibility especially in Nigeria and other developing states, they have also been playing key roles in post-election peace and violence in view of their implicit coverage and post election assessment reports which most of the times, the opposition groups take advantage to achieve international attention, sympathy and other latent electoral ends as noted by Smidt, (2016). He also observed that most states do as much as they can to avoid post election violence before international observation missions in view of its international implications to the credibility of such elections and the state as these observers often blame the governments/ruling party for failure or violence more than the

opposition. These international observers sometimes further incite or fuel post election violence, especially where such elections have elements of malpractice.

One of the greatest threats to politics, democracy and elections is illegal or excessive usage of money in politics and the electoral process as individuals, governments and parties or groups with cash at hand can do much to undermine elections, parties' activities, and even election results in multitudinous ways. The issue of money is tied to politics and democracy because democracy does not have what Griner & Zovatto (as cited in Casas-Zamora & Zovato, 2016, p. 17) referred to as 'operating cost' and thus it is financed by individuals, political parties, states and groups. But despite indispensability of money in politics, its excessive use diminishes the values and essence of the democracy and its institutions. The elections and their conducts have been more expensive in Nigeria and every election period is marked by excessive use and exchange of money between and among the state, politicians, citizens and other stakeholders. Individuals, parties and groups require money to carry out their political activities (campaigns, advertisements, hire offices, publicity and enlightenment, providing education to members, etc.) which require money as asserted by Woldenberg (as cited in Casas-Zamora & Zovato, 2016, p. 11). These are more resource demanding in large democracies like Nigeria, but the extent to which money is used, exchanged and doled out among stakeholders during elections in Nigeria has been excessive as Fagge (2002:82-90), Jacob & Abdullahi (2007), Obasanjo & Mabogunje (1992) have lamented the extent to which the Nigerian politics and public office holding have become. This significantly compromises both credibility of elections and the integrity of most of the stakeholders as economic motives influence and undermine electoral processes, legitimacy and the entire democracy, particularly where there is widespread poverty (Casas-Zamora & Zovato, 2016).

### Summary and Conclusion

Electoral reforms are part and parcel of achieving democracy and may need to be carried out from time to time depending upon experience and circumstances. Where such reforms are well conceived and enforced, they restore or boost the electorates' confidence and hope for elections, democracy and political system. All the same, for any electoral reform in Nigeria to achieve its goals, it must critically examine issues of independence of INEC in terms of appointment and funding, roles of the judiciary in handling elections petitions and contests, status quo power, excessive usage of money, electoral violence and security during



elections. In the recent, there have been electoral law amendments, acts, or reforms in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2010. Notably, there was the 2007 justice Uwais committee, which came up with various electoral initiatives, but all swept under the carpet and recently, there has been the Ken Nnamani electoral reform committee inaugurated in 2016. But electoral reforms are an end in themselves, but a means to an end.

### Recommendations

The number and frequency of electoral reforms in Nigeria alone cannot solve the problem of electoral malpractice, violence, the unpopularity of regimes and opposition. Rather, the electoral laws on the ground must be strictly adhered to; politicians and political parties' coherence and number, leaders, elites, judiciary, civil society groups, electoral bodies and the citizenry must all play their

constitutional, institutional and civic roles. Both winners and losers in elections and especially ruling parties must imbibe the habit of accepting and conceding defeat and embracing peaceful and constitutional means to challenge elections where there may be contests of election results. The issue of patron-client, godfathers must be socially and legally addressed and greatly reduced by the state and citizens since it is not very feasible for laws to eliminate such for the fact they are carried out in covert. Although money cannot be insulated from politics and elections, for Nigeria's politics, democracy, electoral laws and reforms to achieve desired objectives, the extent to which it is schematically emphasized, exchanged, doled out and relied upon by the stakeholders must be checked and all electoral laws concerning use of money especially during campaigns and elections be strictly enforced.

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