THE CONCEPT OF SUPERVENIENCE AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
The concept of supervenience is a well discussed topic in the area of Philosophy of Mind. Some thinkers are trying to place the mind in the physical world. On the basis of the approach to the mind-body problem there are reductive and non-reductive thinkers with their arguments. This paper aims to provide some major viewpoints put forwarded by some prominent philosophers on the idea of supervenience. During the past two decades the concept of supervenience has been increasing service in the philosophy of mind. Its core idea is that the mental is supervenient on the physical. The three components of supervenience are property covariance, dependence and non-reducibility. There are local and global supervenience classified by Some thinkers. Another significant distinction is between logical and natural supervenience. J. Kim explains mind-body supervenience as the thesis that any two things, or events, that, are exactly alike in all physical respects cannot differ in mental respects.
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