The Pragmatic Method: An Anti-Foundational Approach to Inquiry

anasuya agarwala

Abstract


Abstract: This paper attempts to trace the origins, significance, and reach of the Pragmatic Method in epistemological inquiry.  In doing so, it shows pragmatism to be fundamentally anti-foundational and against the traditional methods of Western Philosophy. In examining the notion of Truth (as belief) by using Richard Rorty's version of Pragmatism, it attempts to show Pragmatism as anti-metaphysical and more grounded in its approach to questions of meaning.  

Keywords


Foundationalism; correspondence; Rorty; biologistic tool; belief; anti-metaphysical epistemology; practice

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References


Gutting, Gary. ‘Rorty’s Critique of Epistemology.’ In Richard Rorty, edited by Charles Guinon and David R. Hiley, 41-60. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Rorty, Richard. Consequences of Pragmatism. New York: Harvester Press, 1982.

Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.

Tartaglia, James. Rorty and the Mirror of Nature. London: Routledge, 2007.

Werkmeister, William H. ‘The Pragmatic Pluralism of William James.’ In The History of Philosophical Ideas in America. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949.

Williams, Michael. ‘Rorty on Knowledge and Truth.’ In Richard Rorty, edited by Charles Guinon and David R. Hiley, 61-80. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.


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